Sunday, 29 January 2017

Public Policy & Patent Illegality (Ground for challenge of arbitral award) : After Arbitration Amendment Act 2015



One of the remedies available for a party losing in the arbitration proceeding is to approach the courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (hereinafter termed as ‘the Act’) for setting aside the arbitral award. Section 34 deals with the applications for setting aside arbitral awards on the limited grounds mentioned therein. The grounds mentioned relate to the process of the decision making of the arbitral tribunal and do not envisage the courts getting into the merits of the award. Time and again, various courts have held that the courts should not turn an application under the aforesaid provision into an appeal and should not act as an appellate authority. Of the limited grounds available, one such ground for setting aside the award is provided in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act[1] which provides for setting aside of award if the court finds that the arbitral award is in conflict with the ‘public policy’ of India.

Scope of Public Policy under Section 34 and Section 48
 The interpretation of this term ‘public policy’ has been a matter of contention and has been much debated among practitioners and academicians alike. The sequence of judicial pronouncements on the contentious issue as to what should be the scope of ‘public policy’ and whether it should be given a narrow meaning or an expansive/wide meaning began with the case of RenusagarPower Co. Ltd vs General Electric Co[2], where the Supreme Court of India in a case of international commercial arbitration seated outside India gave a narrow meaning to the term ‘public policy’ and held that while construing expression ‘public policy’ in the context of foreign award under Section 48 of the Act, only an award which is contrary to i) fundamental policy of India, ii) interest of India, iii) justice or morality; would be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to the public policy of India. Subsequently, in a non-international commercial arbitration case of ONGC v. Saw Pipes[3], the Supreme Court gave an expansive meaning to the expression ‘public policy’ under Section 34 of the Act, stating that the expression ‘public policy’ connotes something of public interest or public good, and hence an award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest as such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, apart from the grounds mentioned in the Renu Sagar(supra) judgment, an award can also be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to public policy if the award is patently illegal. The Supreme Court in the case of Phulchand Exports. Ltd. v. OOO Patriot[4], extended the expansive meaning given to the expression ‘public policy’ in ONGC v. Saw pipes(supra) under Section 34 of the Act to the expression used in Section 48 of the Act and held that even in international commercial arbitrations, a foreign award can be set aside on the additional ground of patent illegality. However, subsequently the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Prograto Grano Spa[5], overruled the judgment in Phulchand Exports and restricted the gamut of expression ‘public policy’ in case of international commercial arbitrations under Section 48 of the Act (foreign awards) to the meaning ascribed in the Renu Sagar judgment(supra). The scope of judicial intervention reached to its limits when the Supreme Court in ONGC v. Western Geco[6], expanded the ambit of challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 by giving a broad meaning to the expression “fundamental policy of Indian law”.[7]Thus, the Apex Court widened the gamut of ‘Public Policy’ grounds under Section 34 of the Act for challenging an arbitral award, thereby making international arbitrations seated in India and domestic arbitration extremely vulnerable to judicial intervention.
Arbitration Amendment Act 2015
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 has been amended and it has brought about significant changes with an intention to minimize judicial intervention andachieve the purposes for which the Act was enacted in the first place. One of the significant amendments that have been brought about is in Section 34 of the Act as well as in Section 48 of the Act, where a clarification is provided as to what it means by public policy. An Explanation is added to clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 34 as well as Section 48 of the Act, stating that an award shall be in conflict with the public policy only if it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. A sub-section (2A) has been inserted in Section 34 of the Act envisaging that an arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, provided that the award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of erroneous application of law or by re-appreciation of evidence.
Effect of Arbitration Amendment Act 2015
Now, Section 2(7) of the Act provides that any award made under this Part shall be considered a domestic award. Part I of the Act applies to domestic awards i.e. those awards that are made in India, whether in a purely domestic scenario where none of the parties are in any way ‘foreign’ or those awards that are made in international commercial arbitrations covered within Section 2(1)(f) held in India.[8]Prior to the amendment, the additional ground of ‘patent illegality’ was also available for setting aside the awards passed in an international commercial arbitration seated in India, as an award passed in an international commercial arbitrations seated in India is considered to be a domestic award under Part I of the Act. However, as per the new amendment, the scope of public policy is narrowed down for international commercial arbitrations that are seated outside India as well as for international commercial arbitrations seated in India.
The new amendment does not distinguish between international commercial arbitrations seated in India or outside India and simply lays down that an arbitral award ‘arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitration’ can be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Hence, the ground of patent illegality is available only for purely domestic arbitrations seated in India where none of the parties are in any way ‘foreign’.

The Sasan Power judgment of Supreme Court, though upheld judgment by Madhya Pradesh High Court for other reasons , did not delve into the question of whether two indian parties can legitimately have a foreign seated arbitration and whether such an arbitration would not be in violation of public policy. What would be interesting is when two parties have a foreign seated arbitration, as per Section 44 of the Act, the award passed in such an arbitration would be a 'foreign award' under Part II of the Act. Now, observations in Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment, suggest that two indian parties can have a foreign seated arbitration and legitimacy of such an award qua 'public policy' can be ascertained at the time of enforcement(if the award is to be enforced in India) under Part II of the Act. A pertinent question arises that as per the changed applicability of patent illegality, such an award between two indian parties in a foreign seated arbitration cannot be challenged on the ground of being 'patently illegal' to any laws being force in India, hence cannot be termed as against public policy merely because the award is in patent violation of laws in India. This can be a hurdle when scrutinised by courts in India prior reference to arbitration, as, if such an arbitration clause (between two indian parties in a foreign seat) is held to be valid, the award so passed in such an arbitration cannot be challenged in Indian courts on the ground of being patently illegal against the laws in force in India, and can only be refused to be enforced on the narrow grounds of being against fundamental policy of India, interest of India, justice and morality. However, alternative view can be that the ground of fundamental policy of India is too wide, hence under its compass an award can be refused to be enforced if it so much so against interests of public at large or public good.

In another post, we would analyse various provisions of Arbitration Act discuss the possibility of whether 'two indian parties can have a foreign seated arbitration'.

 Conclusion
The amendment is nevertheless a welcome step as it endeavors to reduce the enhanced judicial intervention in arbitrations, where arbitration was reduced to a mere foreplay to litigation. By providing a clarification as to what it means by ‘public policy’ in the Act itself, the Act has put down to rest the debate on as to what is the gamut or scope of public policy for challenging an award under Section 34 and Section 48 of the Act.


[1]Section 34(2)(b)- An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if the Court finds that i) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force; ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
[2] 1994 SCC Supl. (1) 644.
[3]Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd vs Saw Pipes Ltd, AIR2003SC2629;

[4]Phulchand Exports. Ltd. v. OOO Patriot, (2011)10SCC300;
[5]Shir Lal Mahal v. ProgatoGrano Spa,  (2014)2SCC433;
[6]Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v Western Geco International Ltd, (2014)9SCC263;
[7]“fundamental policy of Indian law” encompasses three juristic principles which are (i) that every court or authority is bound to adopt a “judicial approach” or bona fide approach in the determination of any matter, (ii) the court or authority must, while determining the rights and obligations of parties before it, do so in accordance with the principles of natural justice; and (iii) perversity or irrationality of decisions was to be tested on the touchstone of the Wednesbury principle of “reasonableness”
[8]Balco v. Kaiser, (2012) 9 SCC 552; Read para 88- “Therefore, it would appear that the term “domestic award” means an award made in India whether in a purely domestic context, i.e., domestically rendered award in a domestic arbitration or in the international context, i.e., domestically rendered award in an international arbitration. Both the types of awards are liable to be challenged under Section 34 and are enforceable under Section 36of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Therefore, it seems clear that the object of Section 2(7) is to distinguish the domestic award covered under Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 from the “foreign award” covered under Part II of the aforesaid Act; and not to distinguish the “domestic award” from an “international award” rendered in India.”

AUTOMATIC STAY OF AWARD UPON FILING OF PETITION UNDER SECTION 34, AFTER THE AMENDMENT ACT? DELHI HIGH COURT SAYS YES!


A Division bench of the Delhi High Court in Ardee Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd v. Anuradha Bhatia[1], has held in January, 2017, that when a Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) has been filed and such a Petition relates to an award which has been passed under the Act, un-amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015(“Amendment Act”), then an automatic stay would operate on the impugned award, by mere filing of such a Petition, even when such a Petition has been filed post the amendment.

Pre-Amendment Scenario

Before the coming into affect of the Amendment Act, the scenario was that as soon as a Petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed, an automatic stay would operate on the award. This was the case owing to Section 36 of the Act, which read as under:-

“36. Enforcement.  - Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitration award under section 34 has expired, or such application having been made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court."

A plain reading of this section implied that until the application under Section 34 had been disposed off as being refused, the award would not have become enforceable, which means that there would be an automatic stay on the award on the mere filing of the Petition under Section 34.

Post Amendment Scenario

After the coming into affect of the Amendment Act, Section 36 of the Act was amended to read as follows:-

“36. (1) Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,  in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.

(2) Where an application to set aside the arbitral award has been filed in the Court under section 34, the filing of such an application shall not by itself render that award unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay of the operation of the said arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3), on a separate application made for that purpose.

(3) Upon filing of an application under sub-section (2) for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the Court may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, grant stay of the operation of such award for reasons to be recorded in writing:

Provided that the Court shall, while considering the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money,  have   due   regard  to  the provisions for grant of stay of  a money decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”.

Section 36 under the Amended Act, therefore clearly does not make the stay on the impugned award automatic upon filing of Petition under Section 34. The post-amendment scenario is that where an application to set aside an arbitral award is filed under Section 34 before a court, unless the court grants an order of stay of operation of the arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of Section 36(3) on a separate application made for that purpose, the award is not stayed. Sub-section (3) of Section 36 stipulates that upon the filing of an application for stay of operation of the arbitral award, it would be open to the court, subject to such conditions, as it may deem fit, to grant stay of operation of the award for the reasons to be recorded in writing.

However, the question of whether the new Section 36 would be applicable to a Petition under Section 34 would depend upon the applicability of the Amendment Act to these proceedings.

The applicability of the Amendment Act is governed by Serial No. 26 o the Amendment Act, which reads as under:-

“26. Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act.”

This was the issue which was discussed in the judgment of Ardee Infrastructure (Supra)

Interpretation given by Ardee Infrastructure (Supra)

The award in the present case had been passed on 13.10.2015 and the Petitions under Section 34 had been filed on 04.01.2016. The judgement analyzed the language of Serial no. 26 of the Amendment Act and decoded the words “arbitral proceedings” and “in relation to arbitration proceedings”.

This was done in light of the judgment of  Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh v. Steel Authority of India Limited[2], wherein the Court had held that the words, “in relation to arbitration proceedings” include not just the arbitration proceedings but also proceedings before the Court. The judgments of Tufan Chatterjee v. Rangan Dhar[3]and New Tirupur Area Development Corporation Limited v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited [4] were also analyzed wherein it had been held, that the use of the words “arbitral proceedings” specifically implied that the restriction provided under Serial no. 26 was limited, only to proceedings before the arbitral tribunal and not to the Court.

However, the Delhi High Court did not agree with the view of the Calcutta High Court and Madras High Court in this respect. The Delhi High Court in the case of Ardee Infrastructure (Supra) was of the view that once an Arbitration has been conducted under the un-amended Act, it is a substantive right of a party to get it enforced under the un-amended Act. This reading was in view of specific applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which reads as under:-


“6. Effect of repeal. - Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”

Another reasoning which the Delhi High Court had used was that if it is assumed that the converse is true, and the Amendment Act is applicable to Court proceedings arising out of the old arbitrations but not to the old arbitration proceedings themselves, it would give rise to absurdity.  The Amending Act brought about amendments in Section 9 as well as Section 17 of the Act. While Section 9 pertains to interim measures which may be directed by the court prior, during arbitral proceedings or after the making of the award, Section 17 deals with the FAO (OS) Nos.221/16 & 222/16 Page 27 of 30 interim measures which may be ordered by an arbitral tribunal. If the converse interpretation of was to be accepted, then, in respect of arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the amended provisions would apply to proceedings under Section 9 of the said Act, but not to Section 17 thereof. This would result in a serious anomaly.

It is pertinent to note, that such a stand taken by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court is also in stark contrast to the earlier single judge judgment of the Delhi High Court in Raffles Design International v. Educomp Professional Education[5] as well as the single judge judgment of the Bombay High Court in Kochi Cricket Pt Limited . Board of Control for Cricket in India[6].



[1] Decided by the Delhi High Court on 6 January, 2017, Division Bench

[2] 1999 (9) SCC 334
[3] AIR 2016 Cal 213
[4] Application No.7674/2015 in O.P. 931/2015, Madras High Court
[5] Delhi High Court on 7 October, 2016

[6] Bombay High Court on 14th June 2016

Saturday, 28 January 2017

Implied Exclusion or Express Exclusion of Section 9 (Interim measures): Post Amendment of Section 2(2)



The question of applicability of the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (hereinafter referred as 1996 Act) to the Foreign Seated Arbitrations has time and again come up before the Supreme Court of India ("Supreme Court") and various High Courts. Bhatia International[1] had initially held that Part I the 1996 Act shall be applicable to all arbitrations, including arbitrations held outside India, unless the applicability of all or any of its provisions was excluded by parties, expressly or impliedly. Bhatia International was later overruled by a constitution bench judgment in Balco v. Kaiser[2], but only prospectively i.e. applicable only for disputes arising out of agreements which were entered after 6th September 2012. This meant that the Bhatia International judgment was still applicable to all arbitrations agreements entered prior to 6th September 2012.

Thereafter, the legislature enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 which amended the controversial Section 2(2) of the Act. The said section introduced a proviso that expressly provides that provisions of Section 9, 27, 37 (1)(a) and 37(3) of the Act would also apply to international commercial arbitrations even if the place of arbitration is outside India and the arbitral award is enforceable under the provisions of Part II of Act.

Prior to the amendment of Section 2(2), the Supreme Court and the various courts have more or less held one thing that is 'once you choose a particular foreign law as the governing law of the arbitration agreement along with a foreign seat, Part I and its corollary Section 9 are excluded altogether impliedly/by necessary implication'. However, this position of law had to be tested again in light of amendment of Section 2(2) by Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2015.

This came to be tested recently by Delhi High Court[3], which held that the very purpose of amendment of Section 2(2) was to provide the parties in a foreign seated international commercial arbitration a remedy in case properties related to subject matter of arbitration are situated in India. However, with respect to particular facts of the case, where the rules governing the arbitration chosen by the parties contained a provision providing parties the choice to approach any judicial authority/court for interim measures. On a combined reading of amended Section 2(2) and chosen rules, the Delhi High Court concluded that Section 9 of the Act was not excluded impliedly and it had the jurisdiction to pass interim measures in the case.

Analysis
When there is a legal presumption in favour of applicability of a particular provision, particularly when it has been enacted to cure a particular mischief, whether there is a need to reaffirm the presumption by expressly including it in the agreement to demonstrate the true intention of the parties or there is a need to rebut the presumption of applicability by way of an express exclusion?

This judgment along with a few judgments of Madras High Court and Delhi High Court seems to provide an answer to the questions posed above. A judgment of Delhi High Court in Aitreya Ltd. V. Dans Energy Pvt. Ltd.[4], in a similar case where the parties had agreed for a foreign law(laws of England) to govern their arbitration with a foreign seat, but in the agreement had provided that the parties shall have right to approach any court or competent jurisdiction for suitable interim relief. After analyzing the various Supreme Court judgments of Bhatia, Yograj Infrastructure, Videocon Industries the Delhi High Court came to conclusion that there is no implied exclusion as in this case there is right provided to the parties to approach the courts for interim relief in the Agreement itself.
In another recent unreported judgment of the Madras High Court[5], the High Court has held that in a Pre-Balco Arbitration Agreement, even though the parties have expressly chosen foreign law to be applicable to the main contract, foreign law governing the arbitration agreement and seat of arbitration in a foreign country, if the parties had expressly agreed by inserting a provision that for interim measures they can approach the Indian Courts, the provision of providing Indian courts with supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings empowering it to pass interim measures for the same is valid and would prevail. Thus, as the parties have expressly included and made applicable Section 9 of the Act to the said arbitration, implied exclusion principle shall not apply in such a scenario. In that case, similar like the Bhatia case, the chosen law/rules contained a provision that parties are free to approach a court of competent jurisdiction for interim measures. 

The following scenarios emerge from the various judgments:-
i)                    Where the chosen foreign law/rules do not contain provision for interim measure(from courts of competent jurisdiction) - In this scenario, there will be implied exclusion of applicability of Section 9 and express inclusion of applicability of Section 9 in the agreement becomes necessary to demonstrate the intention of the parties (because there would be implied exclusion of Section 9)( Aitreya, Finnfund, Raffells)
ii)                  Where the chosen foreign law/rules contain provision for application to courts of competent jurisdiction for interim measures(like Bhatia, Raffells, Finnfund, Aitreya)- implied exclusion cannot be inferred as one, there is a provision in the foreign rules for interim measure; two, there is a presumption in the Act which provides for applicability of Section 9 unless excluded. In such a case, express exclusion is required to be made to demonstrate the intention of non-applicability of Section 9.

The following formulae would illustrate the current settled position after taking into consideration the Arbitration Amendment Act 2015, Bhatia judgment and the various Supreme Court and High Court judgments as to in which scenario Section 9 of 1996 Act shall stand impliedly excluded :-

i)                    Foreign Seat + Foreign law – (Minus) interim measure( for courts in chosen law/rules) – Section 9 (No mention of applicability in Agreement) = Implied Exclusion

ii)                  Foreign Seat + Foreign law + interim measure (for courts in chosen law/rules) – Section 9 (No mention of applicability in Agreement) ≠ (Not equals to) Implied Exclusion

(Bhatia, Aitreya, Raffles Design and Section 2(2) post amendment i.e. Presumption of applicability)

iii)                Foreign Seat + Foreign law – interim measure (chosen law/rules) + Section 9 (Specific mention for applicability in Agreement) ( Aitreya Judgment) ≠ Implied Exclusion

iv)                Foreign Seat + Foreign law + interim measure(in chosen law/rules) + Section 9 (Specifically mentioned for applicability in Agreement) ≠ Implied Exclusion (Finnfund Judgment)

v)                  Foreign Seat + Foreign law + interim measure(in chosen law/rules) + Section 9( Specific mention for non-applicability in Agreement) = Express Exclusion

+ means ‘Plus’ (Together mentioned in the Agreement)
–     Means ‘Minus’
= Equals to or Amounts to
≠ Not equals to or Does not Amounts to


[1] Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, (2002) 4 SCC 105.
[2] Bharat Aluminum and Co. vs. Kaiser Aluminium and Co. (2012) 9 SCC 552.
[3] Raffles Design International ... vs Educomp Professional Education ... on 7 October, 2016; https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166921970/
[4] Aitreya Ltd. V; Dans Energy Pvt. Ltd., 2012(127)DRJ565; https://indiankanoon.org/doc/67234386/
[5] Finnish Fund for Industrial Corporation Ltd.(FinnFund) v. VME Precast Pvt. Ltd.; O.A. No. 786 to 789 of 2014 in A.No. 6198 & 6199 of 2014